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The Hart-Fuller Debate 50 Years On Australian National University College of Law 17-19 December 2008 My rather disparate comments are unified in two ways. One is that they track what I understand to be the steps in Hilary's argument. The other is through the overarching theme that Peter Cane captures among his choice of topics: namely, that the transnational is an important vantage point for the contemporary relevance of and challenges for the Hart-Fuller debate. By transnational, I mean not only international law, 7 but also international human rights, transitional justice and legal pluralism -all places where law and ideas of law meet or cross borders. I will end by suggesting how this theme of the transnational might be taken further.
Hilary's assigned theme of "human rights" could mean either the concept of human rights in the abstract or human rights law, as it exists in international or domestic form. Hilary takes it as international human rights law, while noting that Nuremberg and Nazi-era law form a conceptual human rights context for the Hart-Fuller debate. Her paper pairs the post-1958 rise of a global international human rights culture with another legal development relevant to the Hart-Fuller debate, the emergence of rule of law programmes as a major export to developing, post-conflict and transitional societies, and examines the two in light of one another and in light of the debate. Rather than examine the debate as a philosophical disagreement, Hilary fruitfully approaches it, as Nicola Lacey puts it elsewhere, as "a moral and practical disagreement about which institutional arrangements are likely to maximize the realization of valued social ends or ideals under specific social and historical conditions."
8
The Hart-Fuller legacy that emerges from Hilary's paper is unexciting or worse. She concludes with the somewhat scandalous observation that to a modern human rights lawyer, the two sides of the debate are more or less the same. But the gist of her argument is that not only don't Hart and Fuller address human rights, their conceptions of the rule of law turn out to hinder others from addressing them in post-conflict societies. What can be said, or at least asked, to connect Hilary's analysis differently with the Hart- 21 Each of these cases is complex, but suffice it to say that they illustrate broadly that morality in the Hart-Fuller debate was a ready-made place for international human rights that the latter has sometimes occupied.
III Exporting the Rule of Law
The majority of Hilary's paper is devoted to the provocative argument that rule of law, which she says
Hart and Fuller do talk about, turns out to be an obstacle to international human rights in post-conflict and transitional societies, particularly to the introduction of international economic, social and cultural rights. Here we come to the meatiest roles played by Hart and Fuller in Hilary's paper; namely, that neither Hart nor Fuller is part of the solution to this problem of undermining human rights. In addition, they do not help build a case for Hilary's proposal to harness the power of rule of law and expand it to include human rights and, in particular, economic, social and cultural rights.
18 Ibid. at 284. Hilary raises a number of problems with these rule of law projects, all of which may be described as problems of contingency. She does not come out against the idea of rule of law, but criticizes what she portrays as a technocratic, institution-building approach to its delivery by outsiders, the lack of attention to local political, economic, social and cultural conditions (part A), and the effect that its dominance as the vehicle for international assistance has had on the achievement of international human rights (part B).
A A Template for Institutions: Would Hart and Fuller Agree?
Hilary describes the projects favoured by the international community as focusing primarily on the creation or strengthening of legal institutions and using these institutions as the measure of success. The result is a technocratic approach that leans toward exporting Western models of legal institutions. Legal experts from the western nations, particularly the United States, are playing an important role in facilitating this transition [from tribal and customary law to enacted law in newly independent states in Africa and Asia]. Those who have performed this function have often regretted that they were not more adequately prepared for it by a deeper understanding of legal anthropology. If they had had a better training in that subject, they believe that they would have had a better comprehension of the meaning of customary law for those who live by it. … For those who have never attempted to create or live by a system of explicitly enacted rules … the neat geometry of legal positivism is not merely largely irrelevant, but becomes positively dangerous.
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Those more knowledgeable about Fuller's life and work than I, will have a better sense of whether he was active or actively interested in law and development and whether he was part of the problem Hilary identifies (perhaps even whether his thinking was shaped by the postcolonial encounter). But at a general level, there is also support for the idea that he might be part of a solution. Fuller was interested in a great variety of legal structures, including mediation and even choosing by lot. Kenneth Winston describes a principal task of Fuller's eunomics as describing such models of possible structures in detail -in both their structural and moral aspects -and assessing the possibilities for their realization in specific social contexts. 25 The key point, though, is that Fuller's inner morality of law concerns the qualities of law and the social conditions that these create for individual freedom, rather than particular legal institutions. Indeed, Martin Krygier's view, to which Hilary is sympathetic, is that a better approach is to see the rule of law as a social outcome, which is consistent with this point.
B Silencing International Human Rights: Hart's Positivism Abroad
Hilary's main criticism of rule of law projects is their effect on human rights. Specifically, she argues that rule of law discourse has resulted in the "displacing, consuming or eviscerating" human rights analysis in the concrete context of post-conflict societies in which international organizations, foreign governments, NGOs or others have intervened to fund and implement various rule of law projects. One way to understand Hilary's paper in relation to the debate is as an empirical counter-example to
Hart's argument. If she is saying that in post-conflict societies, rule of law discourse has a silencing effect on human rights analysis, then she is also telling us that Hart's moral argument for positivism is contingent on the existence of specific political and cultural conditions. Hilary does not make this point and for it to hold, we would need to learn more about the exact dynamics of the silencing, but these consequences are significant for the Hart-Fuller debate.
26 Charlesworth, supra note 3 at 11. 27 Hart, supra note 1 at 598.
28 Ibid. at 597. law and the agency of the legal subject may support an argument that the rule of law includes human rights and possibly even economic rights. I cannot do justice to these arguments, but want to flag them as another important point of contact between the Hart-Fuller debate and Hilary's proposal.
As Hilary notes, Hart provides a set of cautions against her proposal. 33 But a practical caution that she does not take up comes from the earlier analysis in her paper. One of her paper's strengths is its sensitivity to how concepts get used and appropriated and how they can go wrong on the ground. So long as we are adding economic, social and cultural rights to a concept of rule of law controlled 29 Fuller, supra note 1 at 643. 32 Doctoral work in progress. 33 Charlesworth, supra note 3 at 8-9 (discussing Nicola Lacey's "modest, positivist proposal which Hart defended against Fuller.").
The 2008 primarily by international organizations, foreign aid agencies and private foundations, then how can we be assured that adding them will not subject them to the same problem that Hilary registers for the current rule of law projects sans economic, social and cultural rights? Will they be subject to a technocratic and Western approach and will they, in turn, silence other important forms of justice seeking?
34

V Transnational Terrain
As Hilary's paper compellingly shows, the Hart-Fuller debate has shifted onto transnational terrain; in this case, the international traffic in ideas of the rule of law. By way of concluding comments, I note first that Hart and Fuller already had a foothold on transnational terrain and then suggest a few additional ways in which the transnational is important terrain for the determination of their legacy.
In the 1958 debate, the Nazi grudge informer case, of course, is not an example from Hart's and Fuller's own legal systems (and the extent to which that matters is a bone of contention between them). Both are also alive to international law. Indeed, Hart's disengagement of positivism from the command theory of law has long come to the aid of international lawyers bedeviled by Austin, and Hart's later account of international law as law, rather than morality, can be found in international law casebooks and Second, the transnational may give the edge to Hart over Fuller or the other way around. Consider the rules on statutory interpretation, for instance. The old rule in Canada on how to interpret a statute that implements an international treaty was that the judge could only look to the treaty if the meaning of the statutory provision was unclear. If we were in Hart's "core" and the statutory provision was clear, the treaty was irrelevant; if we were in the "penumbra," it guided the determination of meaning. The Supreme Court of Canada has since held that reference should be made to the treaty at the very outset of the inquiry to determine whether there is any ambiguity, even latent, in the statute. If there is, it must be resolved in favour of the treaty. In addition, simplifying slightly, there is a presumption that all statutes conform with the state's international legal obligations. These rules of interpretation lend support to
Fuller's rejection of Hart's distinction between core and penumbra. On the other hand, this also causes some difficulties for Fuller's inner morality of law, because it is unlikely that a citizen reading the statute will know enough, or even be able to know enough, of Canada's international legal obligations to read the statute such that it complies with them as far as possible. If the defendant can show that the plaintiff failed to discharge that responsibility, the court should refuse to enforce the judgment on the basis that the defendant was deprived of proper notice, a basic condition of natural justice. In this case, the Florida claimants should have notified the appellants of the steps they could take after new versions of the Amended Complaint were filed and, more importantly, of the consequences of not taking those steps. Because they failed to do so, the appellants were unaware of the danger that their defence would lapse." 42 Waldron, supra note 2 at 1.
